Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy
Summer 1994
Annual Institute for Humane Studies Law and Philosophy Issue
Symposium on Presumptions and Burdens of Proof
Presumptions and Transcendentalism
*691 YOU
PROVE IT! WHY SHOULD I?
Lawrence B. Solum [FNa]
Copyright © 1994 Harvard
Society for Law and Public Policy, Inc.; Lawrence B.
Solum
This Article explores ideas developed in
Richard Gaskins' provocative book Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse. [FN1] One idea, familiar
and powerful, is that the conceptual device of a burden of proof is
functionally related to the problem of uncertainty. A second idea, less
familiar and more controversial, is that modern discourse is characterized by
the use of burden shifting arguments that are
premised on a special sort of ignorance -- ignorance of a hidden or
transcendental realm of values. This Article advances two claims in relation to
these ideas. Part I argues that an adequate understanding of the function of
burdens of proof requires attention to the distinction between two sorts of
uncertainty -- that is, to the difference between risk and ignorance. Part II
contends, pace Gaskins, that much of contemporary discourse (in particular, the
work of Rawls and Dworkin) can best be understood as based on an approach to
moral theory that avoids transcendental commitments.
I. Functions of the Burden of Proof
This Part explores the functions served by
the device we call "the burden of proof." At the outset, observe that
the burden of proof is a complex idea that represents at least two different
notions. Using the legal context to illustrate this point, call the requirement
that a party raise an issue "the burden of production." This
requirement can be distinguished from a second requirement, the requirement
that one party satisfy a standard of proof on an issue after it has been
raised. Call this requirement "the burden of persuasion." The burden
of persuasion has two components, the risk of nonpersuasion and the standard of
proof. The risk of nonpersuasion refers to the
consequence that flows if a burden of persuasion is not met. The party that
bears the burden of persuasion carries the risk of nonpersuasion: if the
standard *692 of proof is not met, the issue is decided against the
party that bears the burden. The standard of proof refers to the quality of
convincingness: "beyond resonable doubt," "by clear and
convincing evidence," and "by the preponderance of the evidence"
are all standards of proof. When we use the phrase "burden of proof,"
we sometimes refer to a complex standard incorporating a burden of production
and a burden of persuasion: for example, the prosecution has the burden of
production on each of the elements of a crime, and to meet that burden, the
state must meet a burden of persuasion beyond reasonable doubt. At other times,
we refer to one of these ideas (that is, the burden of production, the risk of
nonpersuasion, or the standard of proof), as the "burden of proof."
With these preliminary points about terminology out of the way, we can address
the function of a burden of proof.
A. Uncertainty and the Burden of Proof
Why do we have burdens of proof? What functions
do such burdens serve? Richard Gaskins suggests that part of the answer to
these questions may be found in our need to cope with what he calls
"ignorance." Under the subheading, "The Varieties of
Ignorance," he writes:
Everyday legal proceedings are supposed to reach definite conclusions
about individual entitlements and responsibilities, notwithstanding any limits
of information. Courts are routinely expected to meet this need, even when
vitally relevant information is either too costly or simply unavailable.
Moreover, judges often reject potential evidence that ordinary observers might
otherwise consider, based on the assumption that it could not be weighed fairly
by a neutral party. Thus the courts deliberately make themselves ignorant of
self- serving statements, of third-hand accounts of what witnesses may have
said, and of the layperson's conjectures on technical matters. Formal legal
rules about the burden of proof compensate for precisely these occasions of
routine or practical ignorance. [FN2] Gaskins goes on to describe other forms of ignorance, but
at this point, let us pause and consider the variety that he terms
"practical." Gaskins uses the phrase "practical ignorance"
to describe the lack of information for which legal burdens of proof compensate.
For reasons that will become clear below, I substitute the term
"uncertainty" for "ignorance." With the substitution in *693
place, we can briefly explore Gaskins' point, bearing in mind the distinctions
between the burdens of production and persuasion.
The function of a burden of proof, according
to Gaskins, is to compensate for uncertainty. [FN3] Take a simple illustrative case. Someone, P, has suffered
an injury, alleging that it has been caused by the negligent actions of another
person, D. P brings a lawsuit against D. Let
us suppose a jury trial has been conducted and all of the evidence has been
heard. The judge instructs the jury that P bears the risk of nonpersuasion on
the issue of causation and that the standard of proof is the preponderance of
the evidence. What is the function of the burden of persuasion in this
situation? First, note that if there is no uncertainty at all, the burden of
proof drops out as a factor in the decision process. If the jury is certain
that D's actions caused P's injury, then D would be entitled to prevail
irrespective of the burden of persuasion or the standard of proof. Second, the
burden of persuasion provides a rule for deciding the case in the event of
complete uncertainty. (For reasons provided below, I call a state of complete
uncertainty "ignorance"). In the unlikely event that the jury
believed that the evidence told us nothing at all about the question whether
D's injuries had been caused by P's actions, that is, that the jury had no
relevant information, [FN4] then D should
prevail on this issue because P has the burden of persuasion. Third and
finally, the standard of proof tells the jury what to do if it believes that
the evidence leaves it somewhere between certainty and ignorance. For example,
if the jury believes that there is a 50/50 or smaller chance that P's action
caused D's injuries, then D is entitled to prevail, because the standard of
proof is the preponderance of the evidence.
Burdens of proof, then, can be seen as
decision rules that provide direction in cases
of uncertainty. To explore this conception of the function of the burden of
proof further, one might consider a more general question: How can one make
rational choices under conditions of uncertainty? Answering that question *694
requires us to take a brief detour and roughly sketch the contours of rational
choice theory.
B. Foundations: A Sketch of Decision Theory
Rational choice theory (or decision theory)
attempts to give a formal account of how rational beings can make decisions
under a variety of conditions. [FN5] The basic story is
familiar folk psychology; that is, rational choice theory formalizes
common-sense assumptions about how people do (and ought to) make choices, at
least in some circumstances. Rational choice theory makes some simplifying
assumptions, which may prove false in real choice situations, but we will leave
consideration of those assumptions aside to get to the point quickly.
We will begin with an example from outside
the law: an actor is faced with making a choice between two actions -- for
example, to eat ice cream or to eat celery. Each action has an associated
consequence; call the consequences of an action its "payoff." Eating
ice cream produces a very pleasant sensation, provides calories (which in turn
may add to one's weight problem), and so on; eating
celery will produce a mildly pleasant sensation, provides virtually no
calories, and provides roughage. The rational choice is the choice with the
best consequences, that is with the most valuable payoff. Let us add a formal,
idealizing assumption to the story: assume that there is a single quantum scale
on which each actor assigns values to actions. Call the units on this scale
"utiles" and the payoff for an action its "utility." This
notion of utility allows us to represent all the consequences of an action with
a single value. In our simple example (Table 1), the rational choice is Action
One, which has a payoff of 5 utiles, as opposed to Action Two, with a payoff of
2 utiles.
Utility
Action One: Eat ice cream.
5
Action Two: Eat celery.
2
Table 1
The discussion that follows does not argue
that the above version of rational choice theory is true; rather, we will
assume that rational choice theory is correct, so that we may focus clearly on *695
the problem that uncertainty poses for our understanding of how people make
choices and how they ought to do so.
In our simple story, we have not yet asked
any questions about how we know what the payoff is. Life is not always certain.
Perhaps one will not like the ice cream -- it might be too cold and cause a
headache -- but perhaps it will be delicious. We can add uncertainty to our
story and get the picture shown in Table 2.
Utility (U) of
Action Given
State
State One: Ice cream State
Two: Ice cream is just
is too cold
right
Choice One: Eat ice
1
5
cream.
Choice Two: Eat celery.
2
2
Table 2
Utility (U) of Action
Given
State
State One:
Ice cream State Two: Ice cream
is Expected
is too cold. (p = just right. (p = .5)
Utility S(p
.5) * U)
Action One: 1 * .5 =
.5 5 * .5 = 2.5 .5 + 2.5 = 3
Eat ice
cream
Action Two: 2 * .5
= 1 2 * .5 = 1 1 + 1 = 2
Eat celery
Table
3
What has just been illustrated is one kind
of uncertainty: the kind for which it is possible to assign probabilities to
the various *696 possible states. Let us refer to this sort of
uncertainty as "risk." Under conditions of risk, it is rational to
maximize expected utilities. At least it is rational in the sense that this
strategy will, if applied to many choice situations, result in a greater sum of
payoffs in the long run than will any alternative strategy. A caveat: this is a
very simple version of the rational choice story; for example, it omits any
discussion of risk preference or aversion, avoiding issues that must be faced
in a more complete version of the theory.
2. The Idea of Ignorance
But what if we do not know what the chances of the ice cream being too
cold are? Suppose that we have no basis for assessing the probability that the
ice cream is too cold; we have no prior experience, no way to sample the ice
cream, no information other than the knowledge that the ice cream will either
be too cold or not too cold. The theory will no longer be able to identify the
rational choice. Returning to the ice cream and celery example, as illustrated
in Table 4, one now cannot act rationally by maximizing expected utility. By stipulation, we have no information about
the probabilities of State One and State Two, and hence we cannot discount the
utility of each payoff by the likelihood that it will occur.
Utility (U) of Action
Given
State
State One:
Ice cream State Two: Ice cream is
just Expected
is too
cold. (p = right. (p = ?) Utility
.?) S(p * U)
Action One: 1 * ?
= ? 5 * ? = ? ?
Eat ice
cream
Action Two: 2 * ?
= ? 2 * ? = ? ?
Eat celery
One may call the condition in which we are
truly in the dark about probabilities of possible states "ignorance."
Ignorance and risk are both forms of uncertainty, but in a condition of risk,
one can assign probabilities (or at least qualitative assessments) to the
possible states, whereas in a condition of ignorance, one lacks information on
which to base such an assignment.
Is there an alternative to the method of
expected utilities that will allow us to make a rational choice under
conditions of ignorance? Consider some possible methods for coping with
ignorance:
.*697 . Guess: for example, assume
that each state is equiprobable.
. Play it safe: choose the action with the
best worst-case outcome.
. Go for it: choose the action with the best
best-case outcome.
There are many other possible strategies for
coping with ignorance, but there is no knock-down argument that any such
strategy is more rational than any of the others as a general rule for deciding
how to act under conditions of ignorance. Each of the strategies has serious
problems.
Consider, for example, some of the problems
with guessing. Assuming that each state is equiprobable has the advantage of
allowing the calculation of expected utilities, but there is a price to be
paid. Why is it any more rational to assume the states are equally probable
than to make some other guess, for example
that the probability of State One is 0.3 and the probability of State Two is
0.7? Moreover, the equiprobability assumption makes the way one slices up the
possible states of the world very important. Why not three states, for example
ice cream is too cold, ice cream is almost too cold, ice cream is just right?
Suddenly, the probability of too cold becomes 0.33 instead of the 0.5 that was
assigned when there were two equiprobable states!
The alternative strategies, playing it safe
and going for it, also have problems. Playing it safe under conditions of
ignorance has a certain appeal. By choosing the action with best worst-case
payoff -- call this the "maximin strategy" [FN6] -- one can be sure
to avoid the worst disaster. No headaches from eating cold ice cream! But why
is it rational to be so conservative? Why deprive oneself of the pleasure of
eating ice cream because of an unknown risk of a headache? Why not go for it?
If one fails to choose the action with the best best-case outcome -- call this
the "maximax strategy" -- one will never know how good it could have
been. I will refrain from further rhetorical questioning, but I hope my
informal argument has conveyed the sense of the more rigorous debate in
decision theory. Although the debate may not yet be finally settled, there
simply does not seem to be any generally applicable strategy for rational
choice under conditions of ignorance. The lack of a generally applicable
strategy does not, however, mean that we are utterly lost when confronted with
ignorance. We do make choices when we are truly in the dark, *698 and in different situations we may
employ each of the strategies outlined above.
To sum up: rational choice theory allows us
to formalize some common-sense ideas. People choose the action that will
produce the best consequences. Some choices must be made despite a lack of
certainty about what the consequences will be. Two sorts of uncertainty can be
distinguished. The first, risk, obtains when one knows or can estimate the
probabilities of the various possible consequences. The second, ignorance,
obtains when one does not know and cannot estimate these probabilities. Under
conditions of risk, the rational choice is the one that maximizes expected
utilities. Under conditions of ignorance, it is not clear whether any strategy
for choosing is uniquely rational.
C. Decision Theory Applied to the Case of Destruction of Evidence
Consider the implications of this conceptual
apparatus for a problem the law faces in allocating the burden of proof. [FN7] This problem
arises in the context of the destruction of evidence; such destruction usually
becomes an issue when done by a party to a civil or criminal case. [FN8] Destruction of evidence may create uncertainty. [FN9] Documents are shredded; a tape is erased; the murder
weapon has vanished. As a result, uncertainty increases. Was there a smoking gun with the fingerprints of
the defendant? Or someone else? How does the law cope with this uncertainty?
Consider two hypothetical cases. In the
first, "the case of the burned will," Jane has recently died, leaving
two children, Tom and Bill. Before her death, Jane wrote a will and told her
friends that she left all her money to one of her two sons. After Jane's death,
her servant Walter, hiding behind a curtain, sees Tom take the will from the
safe, read it, and then burn it. Under the *699 law of intestate
succession, Tom and Bill would share equally in her estate. [FN10] What will the
law do? In situations akin to the case of the burned will, the classic legal
solution has been to infer -- from the fact that Tom burned the will -- the
conclusion that the will would have been unfavorable to him; in this case, the
inference is that the will left everything to Bill. The inference is sometimes
called the "spoliation inference," deriving from the Latin maxim
omnia praesumuntur contra spoliatorem. [FN11] Everything is
presumed against a wrongdoer. The assumption behind the inference is that Tom
would only destroy the will if it named Bill as the sole heir, because only in
that situation would destruction of the will be in Tom's self interest.
In the second case, "the case of the
shredded files," the Acme Manufacturing Company, the nation's leading
maker of widgets, has been involved in a series of bitter disputes with its
rival, Zenith Widgets Incorporated. Zenith has been making noises about filing
an antitrust action against Acme. A few days before the suit is filed, a secretary at Acme shreds
all of the documents that could have sorted out the truth of Zenith's claims. [FN12] The documents
were destroyed pursuant to a policy under which these files are routinely
shredded once every twenty-four months.
In the case of the burned will, the
destruction of the will creates uncertainty about its contents. Nonetheless,
the inference that we can draw from Tom's act of destruction allows us to deal
with that uncertainty. If we had the will itself, we could know what it said
with absolute certainty; without the will, we have the inference that it is
more likely than not that the will favored Bill. Although Tom may protest that
he destroyed the will to protect his brother from Jane's hurtful action, we are
inclined to think that version of events is less likely than the one in which
Tom destroyed the will to get half the estate rather than none of it. The law
copes with the form of uncertainty that we are calling "risk" by
allowing Bill to meet his burden of persuasion by the requisite quantum of
proof, that is a preponderance of the evidence. The spoliation inference is
sufficient to shift the burden *700 of persuasion to Tom, who now must
prove that the will did not favor Bill. [FN13]
The case of the shredded files concerns a
different sort of uncertainty. The spoliation inference does not seem to fit
this case, because the files were destroyed pursuant to a routine policy and
were not destroyed in direct response to the
filing of a complaint by Zenith against Acme. Without the inference from
intentional destruction, we really do not know what the files would have
proved; in the terminology that we have adopted, we now face that kind of uncertainty
we call "ignorance." But the law can deal with this ignorance. For
example, the courts could raise an presumption of law that evidence that is
unreasonably destroyed would have been unfavorable to the party that destroyed
it. In the case of the shredded files, that presumption would result in a shift
of the burden of persuasion. Acme would now carry the burden of proving with a
preponderance of the evidence that it did not commit an antitrust violation.
Deprived of its own files that bear on the question, Acme might be unable to
produce evidence sufficient to meet that burden of persuasion with a
preponderance of the evidence.
The two cases differ from each other in a
very important way. The case of the burned will involves uncertainty as risk;
the court could make a decision that was rational (in these sense that expected
utility would be maximized) by making the decision most likely to be correct.
The case of the shredded files involves uncertainty as ignorance. We cannot say
which decision is most likely to be correct, because we do not have evidence
that establishes the probability that the files would have proved Zenith's
claim against Acme. We are truly in the dark, but the case must be decided
anyway. The courts have had a difficult time deciding cases that are analogous
to our hypothetical case of the shredded files.
In such cases, the creation of a presumption and hence of a corollary burden of
persuasion would frequently decide the dispute. If we presume the evidence was
damaging to the destroyer, then the party that destroyed the evidence is likely
to lose. If we place the burden on the other party to prove that the destroyed
material would have favored its case, then it is unlikely to be able to meet
that burden. No matter where we place the burden, we cannot know the likelihood
that the decision will result in error.
*701 The discomfort elicited by the
case of the shredded files suggests that when we deal with ignorance, our
decision about where to place the burden of proof must be made on some ground
other than maximizing the likelihood that the decision will be accurate
(meaning correct in the sense that it is the decision that would have been
reached had there been no uncertainty). If we do not look to accuracy, then to
what should we look? One possibility is that we should assign the burden of
proof to create incentives that will reduce future uncertainty; we erect a
presumption against destroyers of evidence in order to deter future acts of destruction.
Another possibility is that we should assign the burden of proof to prevent
unfairness; as between Acme, which allowed its employees to destroy evidence
even though a major legal dispute was on the horizon, and Zenith, which did not
act in this unreasonable fashion, we might conclude that it is more fair that
Acme should bear the burden of proof and the corresponding risk that an
erroneous decision will be made.
D. Two Functions for the Burden of Proof
In sum, the main idea of this Part of the
Article is that the notion of a burden of proof has two different but related
functions, with each function corresponding to one of the two varieties of
uncertainty.
1. Dealing with Risk
Sometimes, we deal with risk by assigning a
burden of proof. We know something about the probabilities (either in a general
class of cases or in a particular case). That knowledge underwrites a burden of
persuasion. Thus, in a legal case, allocation of the burden may simply be a
method or procedure for producing the best outcomes in the long run, or (in the
language of decision theory) maximizing the expected utility of legal
proceedings. Usually, this will be the most accurate outcome, but not always.
For example, the burden of persuasion in a criminal case may be proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, because the disutility of convicting an innocent person far
exceeds the disutility of finding a guilty person to be not guilty: better that
ten guilty persons go free than one innocent person be convicted.
In other cases, however, we use the idea of
a burden of proof not to deal with our knowledge of risks but to cope with our
ignorance. Ignorance poses a challenge to the courts that is, in a sense, much
more fundamental than the challenge posed by risk. When we allocate a burden of
proof to cope with ignorance, we cannot say that this minimizes the chances of
an erroneous decision; we do not even know what those chances are. It might be
nice if we could somehow avoid this problem, but that is not an option. The
burden of proof must be assigned to one party or the other. Someone must win
and someone must lose.
II. Burdens Without Transcendentalism
This Part takes up Gaskins' discussion of
two more catagories of what he calls ignorance but I call uncertainty. The
connection between this Part and the last will not be immediately apparent. The
earlier discussion of decision theory will be brought to bear in the analysis
of Gaskins' critique of Ronald Dworkin's legal theory and John Rawls's
political philosophy; Gaskins' failure to grasp the difference between risk and
ignorance is related to his criticism of what he calls the
"transcendental" basis of arguments made by Rawls and Dworkin. But to elucidate that relationship, a
number of points must be explored.
A. Consensual and Transcendental Ignorance
After identifying "practical
ignorance" (or "practical uncertainty"), Gaskins discusses two
additional sources of ignorance. The first variety Gaskins calls "cultural
ignorance." Gaskins writes:
The language of proof could misleadingly
suggest that factual evidence alone marks the difference between ignorance and
knowledge in public discussion. In legal proceedings, as in wider rhetorical
contexts, however, the basic norms or rules for weighing evidence often
contribute more fundamentally to the condition of ignorance. These rules are
the reigning presumptions used by the legal system to interpret and to draw
conclusions from factual evidence. When uncertainty arises about the meaning or
legitimacy of these presumptions, a more profound level of ignorance casts its
shadow over the strategic course of argument. This source of ignorance is not *703
merely informational, but largely consensual or cultural in origin. [FN14]
In addition, Gaskins identifies a second
variety of ignorance, which I will call "transcendental ignorance."
Gaskins writes, "finally, in addition to practical and consensual
indeterminacies, we can identify an even more fundamental
level of public ignorance. This distinctive notion is ultimately derived from
philosophical theories about hidden, or transcendental, layers of possible
knowledge." [FN15] He
continues, "as commonly applied to the duality of facts and values, for
example, transcendental theory projects a realm of potential knowledge (the realm
of values) while denying that human beings have direct sensory access to
it." [FN16] One observation about Gaskins' notion of transcendental
theory is appropriate at this point: We lack direct sensory access to a great
deal of knowledge, ranging from knowledge of scientific entities like atoms and
molecules, which we cannot perceive directly, to knowledge of events like our
parents' wedding, which most of us could not attend. On the one hand, if lack
of direct sensory access is the criterion of the transcendental, then the
transcendental realm is quite large. On the other hand, if the transcendental
realm is hidden in some more profound sense, then we might ask what the precise
criterion of the transcendental is.
Gaskins' exploration of the role of burden
shifting arguments in relationship to these two varieties of ignorance is rich
and complex, and this Article cannot do it justice. What it can do is to
isolate particular examples of that exploration, that is, Gaskins' claim to
have identified transcendental assumptions in the work of Dworkin and Rawls.
*704 B. Is
Hercules a Transcendentalist?
The basic outline of Dworkin's normative and
descriptive theory of judicial decisionmaking is, by now, likely to be quite
familiar to the readers of this Symposium, and I will not be repeat it here. [FN17] Instead, I turn
directly to Gaskins' interpretation of that argument, which he summarizes as
resting on the following moves:
1. We can presume there are correct answers
to questions about legal rights, even though we may not know (or be able to
prove) what they are.
2. We can presume there is a complex
procedure appropriate for discovering rights in controversial situations, even
though that procedure cannot itself be formulated as a series of rules.
3. We can presume that judges are uniquely
placed to perform this procedure, even though no one else is in a position to
measure their success against independent criteria. [FN18]
Consider the first of these three points as
an example of Gaskins' argument. Does Dworkin argue that we can presume the
truth of the right-answer thesis, even though we cannot know what they are?
Gaskins offers as evidence the following passage from Taking Rights Seriously:
Some readers may object that, if no
procedure exists, even in principle, for demonstrating what legal rights the
parties have in hard cases, it follows that they have none. That objection
presupposes a controversial thesis of general philosophy,
which is that no proposition can be true unless it can, at least it principle,
be demonstrated to be true. There is no reason to accept that thesis as part of
a general theory of truth, and good reason to reject its specific application
to propositions about legal rights. [FN19] If this were the only argument that Dworkin gave in
defense of the right-answer thesis, Gaskins might have a point. [FN20] But this passage is not Dworkin's primary argument in
favor of the thesis; indeed, as is apparent from the text itself, Dworkin's aim
here is to answer an argument that might be raised against the idea that *705
there can be rights at all. This argument that there are no rights at all is
based on the notion that no proposition can be true unless there is a method
for demonstrating that it is true. Dworkin then argues that this argument is
false for two reasons. The first reason, which Dworkin does not elaborate, is
that there are many propositions that are true but cannot be demonstrated to be
true. Indeed, Gaskins is quite familiar with this fact; the problem of ignorance
is central to his work. There are many garden-variety factual propositions that
are true, but which will never be provable simply because we lack the
information to prove them.
The second reason, which Dworkin elaborates
in depth, is that legal propositions in particular can be true even though
there is no procedure for proving them. [FN21] It is crucial to distinguish between demonstration (the
sort of reason-giving involved in deductive systems such as Euclidean geometry)
and reason-giving. Dworkin does not claim
that we have legal rights but are incapable of giving good reasons for
believing in them. He does argue that we cannot demonstrate their existence.
Legal reasoning is not like geometry, but the same is true of many realms of
human discourse.
It is fair to ask Dworkin to give an account
of legal reasoning that includes the giving of good reasons without
demonstrations. Dworkin provides this account in his story of Hercules, an
imaginary judge. [FN22]
Sometimes Hercules will be faced with a hard case, a case in which a statute is
ambiguous or the common law provides support for both sides to a controversy.
When Hercules is faced with such a hard case, he uses a procedure of
construction to arrive at the right answer in the case before him. The method
of construction requires him to achieve coherence between his decision in the
case before him and the law as a whole. In particular, the best decision must
fit the existing body of law and provide the best justification for it.
Hercules constructs a theory of the law that decides the case before him and fits
and justifies the law as a whole. [FN23]
Dworkin's Hercules is an idealization of a
real judge. If Dworkin is correct and the law is a seamless web, the decision
of any hard case potentially requires the judge to develop a theory of *706
the law as a whole. Real judges lack the time to construct such a theory from
scratch every time they decide a hard case. Good judges must develop a working
theory of the law and may rely on hunches
about which lines of argument are likely to prove fruitful. Dworkin's story of
Hercules offers a rational reconstruction of the process that real judges
approximate.
Does the use of this idealization commit
Dworkin to the belief in a transcendental or hidden realm of value? Surely not.
The method that Dworkin proposes for legal reasoning is one that can be applied
to reasoning about many types of questions. Dworkin himself explores the
connections between his approach to legal reasoning and the interpretation of
literary texts. But the point can be made more clearly if we consider how we
reason about ordinary human affairs. Forexample, we need to interpret the
actions of a neighbor to figure out their meaning. Why is our neighbor building
a fence? We construct a theory of her motives and beliefs; the ideal theory
would fit her action on this occasion into a coherent story about her life as a
whole. Unless we are writing a biography, however, we will have to make do with
a rough-and-ready sort of theory, based on limited data and arrived at after
brief deliberation. We cannot provide a demonstration for our rough theory of
our neighbor's behavior; interpretation of human behavior is not like Euclidean
geometry.
If asked what method we employed, we might
use an idealization to explain what we are doing. If pressed, we might say that
when dealing with other people, one should aim at the interpretation of their
behavior that a biographer with full access to their life story would give. But
using this idealization does not commit us
to the proposition that our neighbor's motives and beliefs are to be found in a
biography shelved in the central library of some transcendental realm. You
cannot see, touch, taste, or smell other people's motives and beliefs, but
basing your actions on inferences about them does not involve metaphysical
extravagance. [FN24]
Dworkin's Hercules possesses extraordinary intellectual virtues, but he does
not inhabit Mount Olympus.
*707 C. Does
the Veil of Ignorance Shroud a Transcendental Realm?
I assume that the readers of this Symposium
will be familiar with the argument of A Theory of Justice. [FN25] From the
beginning, however, there has been confusion about the role of the original
position in that argument. Consider Gaskins' interpretation of the original
position:
Only by constructing this transcendental
device could Rawls find a point of view from which to conserve the notion of a
self-standing ethical authority independent of the conditioned desires and
secular interests that haunted the utilitarian categories of Orwell's style of
humanism. Structural principles for the just society were validated in being
chosen by individuals behind a carefully constructed "veil of
ignorance." Rawls wanted to ask precisely these individuals to make the
critical inferences about preferred social structures; their lack of information about the specific
consequences of their action, or about the conventions of a specific culture,
guaranteed that their selection could not be based on mere temporal
calculations. The original position theory was thus a transcendental application
of the argument-from-ignorance. It gave an absolute preference to inferences
made in a postulated temporal vacuum, where transcendental norms were presumed
to be the default criteria. [FN26] This interpretation badly misses the mark, but that does
not mean that it is groundless. There are reasons for misreading A Theory of
Justice in this way. One reason involves the structure of the book. The
original position is introduced very early, and the argument from the original
position is quite striking. The original position does rely on a veil of
ignorance, and Rawls does borrow the maximin rule from decision theory as a
basis for decisions under conditions of ignorance. So far, Gaskins seems to be
on track.
Moreover, Section 40, entitled "The
Kantian Interpretation of Justice as Fairness," lends support to the
notion that the original position involves transcendental metaphysics. [FN27] In particular,
consider the following passage: "My suggestion is that we think of the
original position as the point of view from which noumenal selves see the
world." [FN28] This passage might seem to offer support for Gaskins'
interpretation -- the phrase "noumenal selves" suggests *708
beings that actually inhabit a transcendental realm -- but there is another
side to the story.
The other side of the story begins with two observations about the
Kantian interpretation. First, we ought to be very careful in drawing sweeping
conclusions about Rawls's view of Kant from the condensed discussion in Section
40 of A Theory of Justice; Rawls made it clear that his views were different
from Kant's in several respects but begged our indulgence for his inability to
elucidate fully those differences in the compressed discussion in A Theory of
Justice. [FN29]
Second, Rawls has clarified the relationship
between his political constructivism and Kant's moral constructivism in his
recent book Political Liberalism. [FN30] The clarification in the latter work suggests that Rawls
rejects the proposition that his constructivism entails transcendental
commitments. The passage that follows is taken from a larger discussion of the
role of autonomy in Rawls's views as compared to its role in Kant's moral
theory. After discussing the way in which political liberalism understands the
autonomy of a political view, Rawls writes:
Another and deeper meaning of autonomy says that
the order of moral and political values must be made, or itself constructed, by
the principles and conceptions of practical reason. Let us refer to this as
constituitive autonomy. . . . Constituitive autonomy says that the so-called
independent order of values does not constitute itself but is constituted by
the activity, actual or ideal, of practical (human) reason itself. I believe this, or something like it, its Kant's view.
His constructivism is deeper and goes to the very existence and constitution of
the order of values. This is part of his transcendental idealism. The
intuitionist's independently given order of values is part of the
transcendental realism Kant takes his transcendental idealism to oppose.
Political liberalism must, of course, reject
Kant's constitutive autonomy. . . . And certainly political constructivism
accepts his view that the principles of practical reason originate, if we
insist on saying they originate anywhere, in our moral consciousness as
informed by practical reason. They derive from nowhere else. [FN31]
*709 Wrenched from context, this
passage is heavy going. For our purposes, two points should be made. First,
Rawls is right about Kant: Kantian constructivism does not entail a
metaphysical commitment to the reality of an independent realm of
transcendental values. Indeed, the point of Kant's enterprise is to deny
transcendental realism and to affirm that human reason, not some transcendental
realm, is the source of moral values. There may be forms of intuitionism that
are committed to the existence of a transcendental order of moral values, but
Kant's theory is not a form of intuitionism. Second, Rawls contends that his
own view is independent of deep theories like Kant's; Rawls represents that his
view is shallow and that it deliberately avoids transcendental
commitments. Rawls' political
constructivism neither affirms nor denies
the existence of a transcendental realm of values.
Why is Rawls's view a shallow one? The
answer to this question requires us to back up and consider his theory from a
different angle, without reference to the original position until a very late
stage in the argument. In his recent work, Rawls has emphasized the idea that
political liberalism is a response to the fact of pluralism; the fact that
European and North American societies have been characterized by radical
disagreements over ultimate questions of religion and morality since the Wars
of Religion of the Sixteenth Century. [FN32] Political liberalism responds to this fact; a liberal
theory of justice should be a view that can be the subject of an overlapping
consensus among a variety of comprehensive moral and religious perspectives. [FN33] Such a theory must be based on public reason -- on common
sense and values that can be drawn from the public political culture. [FN34]
Given the fact of pluralism, political
liberalism cannot rely on deep premises about metaphysics or the ultimate
source of values. Given Rawls's view of the constraints within which his
political theory must live to serve its intended purpose, he cannot use a
transcendental realm of value as a premise of his arguments. There may be
comprehensive moral or religious views that do incorporate belief in such a
realm, and these views may participate in an overlapping consensus on a liberal
theory of justice. *710 Indeed, it is possible that some moral
intuitionists might affirm Rawls's political theory because they believe it is supported by their
transcendental views, but their arguments for political liberalism from within
their own view are not the arguments of political liberalism itself.
If the argument of A Theory of Justice does
not rely on transcendental premises instantiated in the original position, then
what is the basis of the argument? Gaskins discusses the key to answering this
question: the theory of reflective equilibrium. [FN35] We have already
seen how a procedure such as reflective equilibrium can operate without making
metaphysical assumptions about the existence of a transcendent realm. The
method of reflective equilibrium is analogous to the method employed by
Hercules in deciding hard cases. Reflective equilibrium does not promise
"to bring (at long last) the transcendental realm into direct contact with
everyday experience." [FN36] Putting aside
the fancy terminology, Rawls's argumentative strategy is to take the citizens
of modern democratic societies as they are, with their differences, such as
individual beliefs about religion and morality, and their commonalities, such
as shared resources of public reason. There is no other place to begin; there
are no transcendental tricks that can convince us to affirm a conception of
justice on the basis of arguments that do not take our current beliefs and
motivations as a starting point.
Does Rawls's constructivism necessarily
involve him in transcendental commitments? No; constructivist reasoning can be
simple and straightforward. A parent asks a
child who has hurt a sibling to think about how she would feel if the sibling
had treated her the same way. This is a piece of constructivist reasoning in
its most simple and basic form, and it surely does not entail any extravagant
transcendental metaphysics. The question, "How would you feel if you were
treated that way?", does not commit the parent to belief in some transcendental
realm in which the role reversal actually occurs. [FN37]
Rawls asks us to imagine what sort of
society we would create under conditions that would be fair. The features of
the original *711 position must be justified independently, by the
method of reflective equilibrium, by good arguments from premises that we have
reason to accept. Because the original position is only an argumentative
construct in political philosophy, the argument from the original position
cannot be the only route to justification of principles of justice. The same
principles might be justified by any number of argumentative strategies. The
original position may provide focus; it allows us to formalize considerations
of fairness that might otherwise be difficult to clarify. The original position
is laid out as a step in a constructivist argument; it is not a position in
transcendental space.
To bring the argument full circle, consider
the connection between the method of reflective equilibrium and the problem of
uncertainty. Gaskins reads Rawls as if Rawls were offering an argument that
proved the truth of his theory of justice with apodictic certainty. Perhaps
transcendental arguments promise freedom
from doubt and disagreement, but this is not the goal of reflective
equilibrium. As Rawls puts it, "The struggle for reflective equilibrium
goes on indefinitely." [FN38] Once we put aside the notion that Rawls is after apodictic
certainty, then the push to read transcendental commitments into his arguments
dissolves. Analogously, we sometimes create inferences, presumptions, and
burdens of to deal with uncertainty, but it would be a terrible mistake to
mistake a presumption for certain knowledge of the facts presumed.
Conclusion
Is Gaskins right to see transcendental
commitments lurking behind the use of burden shifting arguments in contemporary
discourse? The starting point for an answer to this question is the distinction
between uncertainty as risk and uncertainty as ignorance. Some burden shifting
arguments are based on risk (or nonprobabilistic cousins of risk). Sometimes we
can produce a good argument for a conclusion that falls short of certainty, but
that does make the conclusion more likely than not. In these circumstances, a
burden shifting argument is simply rhetorical shorthand: given the balance of
reasons, one should believe this conclusion, unless something has been
overlooked. No transcendental *712 commitment is entailed by this
routine use of burden shifting as a rhetorical technique.
Sometimes a burden of proof is employed in connection with conditions of
ignorance. One can imagine burden-shifting arguments that do involve
transcendental commitments. For example, "you cannot prove that Angels do
not exist because they inhabit a transcendental realm outside of human experience."
But it does not follow that every argument which establishes a burden of proof
to deal with a condition of ignorance involves a transcendental commitment.
Recall the way the law deals with the destruction of evidence. We are faced
with our ignorance of the facts, but we must act, and so we make an inference
or we establish a presumption or a burden of proof. The establishment of a
presumption that destroyed evidence would be unfavorable to the spoliator does
not commit the law to the proposition that our hypothetical destroyed files
still exist in some transcendental filing cabinet. The burden of proof is
simply a practical device for resolving a practical problem. We can argue for
such a burden on the basis of common-sense considerations such as fairness or
deterrence of future wrongdoing; no transcendental moves are required.
So far, this Article has established that
the use of burdens of proof in connection with factual risk or ignorance need
not entail transcendental commitments. Gaskins is concerned not with these
factual cases, however, but instead with cases involving values. It is moral
values, according to Gaskins, that are given transcendental status by arguments
from ignorance or burden- shifting arguments. But why is this so? One can give
a good moral, political, or legal argument
that falls short of certainty but avoids any transcendental commitments. Rawls'
use of reflective equilibrium provides one example of how such arguments can
proceed, but moral philosophy, starting with Aristotle, is filled with such
arguments. Indeed, Gaskins gives no reason for the proposition that the use of
arguments from ignorance in moral theory entails a commitment to transcendental
premises. Instead, he seems repeatedly to assume that this is the case.
Early in Burdens of Proof in Modern
Discourse, Gaskins cites a famous passage from Bishop Whately's Elements of
Rhetoric. "There is a 'Presumption' against any thing paradoxical, i.e.
contrary to the prevailing opinion: it may be true; but the Burden of proof
lies with him who maintains it; since men are not to be expected *713 to
abandon the prevailing belief till some reason is shown." [FN39] Most of us do not believe that our practices of argument
commit us to belief in a transcendental realm of values. In his rich and
intriguing book, Richard Gaskins has not met his burden of proof to convince us
otherwise.
[FNa]. Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professor of Law and
William Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount University. I owe
thanks to Randy Barnett, Victor Gold, and David Leonard for their comments on a
draft of this Article.
[FN1]. Richard H.
Gaskins, Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse (1992).
[FN2]. Id. at 4.
[FN3]. Uncertainty may result from a lack of evidence or it may
result from contradictory evidence. See Ronald
J. Allen, Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal
Discourse, 17 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y. 627 (1994).