May, 1999
Reconstructing Liberalism
The Foundations of Liberty
*1780 THE
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW. BY RANDY E.
BARNETT. OXFORD: CLARENDON
PRESS. 1998. PP. XI, 347. $29.95.
Lawrence B. Solum [FNa1]
Copyright © 1999 Michigan
Law Review Association; Lawrence B. Solum
WESTLAW LAWPRAC INDEX
LIT --
Literature Reviews & Analyses
Introduction
Randy Barnett's The Structure of Liberty [FN1] is an ambitious
book. The task that Barnett sets himself is to offer an
original and persuasive argument for a libertarian political theory, a theory
that challenges the legitimacy of the central institutions of the modern
regulatory-welfare state. The Structure
of Liberty is that rare creature, a book that delivers on most of the promises
it makes. Already the book is on its
way to becoming a contemporary classic, the successor in interest to Robert
Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia as a source of ideas and arguments for the
revitalization of an important intellectual tradition that has long stood at
the periphery of legal and political theory.
No one will be surprised that Barnett's argument rests on a controversial
and contested vision of human interaction.
What may come as a shock is the power of this vision to provoke a
thoughtful response from readers with ideological and political commitments
that are poles apart from those articulated in The Structure of Liberty.
One of the great virtues of The Structure of
Liberty [FN2] is that it is
written with an unusual clarity of expression.
Structure avoids a central vice of much contemporary political
philosophy: the book is filled with concrete examples and specific public
policy proposals. At the same time,
Structure embraces the central virtue of modern political theory; the argument
is carefully articulated so as to lay bare the bones of the ideas and expose
them to careful scrutiny. Barnett has
written a readable book that nonetheless will repay careful study.
Despite Structure's many strengths, the book is not without its
flaws. Chief of these is the book's
avoidance of fundamental questions about the nature of political justification. Barnett attempts to *1781 craft an
argument that eschews reliance on any particular framework for political and
moral theory. The result, however, is a work that neither embraces deep
foundations nor provides a compelling explanation for their absence. For this reason, the full implications of Structure
are cloudy, and a final assessment of its merits requires an excavation of its
foundations--an effort that is begun but hardly completed in this review.
What is certain is that Structure provides a
rich and provocative set of arguments that will stimulate strong reactions from
both the friends and foes of its intriguing mix of classical liberalism,
libertarianism, and anarchism. Structure is filled with radical proposals,
ranging from the abolition of criminal punishment to the suggestion that private
adjudication and law enforcement services could replace the state
entirely. Barnett defends these
suggestions with common-sense ideas that are assembled into a powerful
theoretical framework. Even if
Structure does not convert the heathen, it will surely change the topic of many
conversations about the proper function of law.
I. The Structure of Structure
The central argument of Structure aims to
justify a set of ideas about fair social
organization. Barnett calls these ideas
"the liberal conception of justice" (p. 63). The argument for the liberal conception
focuses on three central problems of human interaction: the problem of
knowledge, the problem of interest, and the problem of power. Barnett argues that given "the goal of
enabling persons to survive and pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while
living in society with others" (p. 23), these fundamental problems of human
interaction create constraints on the possible forms of social organization.
Unless society is organized to respect rights of several property, freedom of
contract, restitution, and self-defense, the problems of knowledge, interest,
and power will make it impossible for all persons (or each and every person) to
survive and pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity. Barnett's liberal conception of justice is simply a detailed
formulation of the content of the rights that must be respected. [FN3] Near the conclusion of Structure, Barnett
imagines a society that respects these rights to the hilt, a polycentric *1782
constitutional order in which the state has withered and been replaced by
private associations which provide what economists have traditionally called
"public goods," such as police protection and dispute resolution.
A.
Foundations
If the central argument of Structure is the
justification of the liberal conception of
justice based on the problems of knowledge, interest, and power, the first
chapter is Barnett's attempt to build the philosophical foundation upon which
this justification rests. This chapter
is perhaps the least satisfying in the book, and the issues that it raises will
be examined later in this review. The
central organizing idea is the notion of a natural right. Borrowing terminology
from Philippa Foot, [FN4] Barnett argues that natural rights *1783 are
justified by a "hypothetical imperative" (p. 17). As laid out by Barnett, the hypothetical
imperative includes both a normative and a factual predicate. The normative predicate is the goal of
providing each individual with the opportunity to pursue happiness, peace, and
prosperity. The factual predicate is provided by Barnett's development of the
problems of knowledge, interest, and power.
The conclusion or imperative is the set of rights that Barnett specifies
in his liberal conception of justice, e.g., several property, freedom of
contract, restitution, and self-defense.
Asking the following question can draw out
an important ambiguity in Structure's foundation: to whom is the hypothetical
imperative addressed? One possible
answer is that Structure is addressed to the interest of each and every actual
individual in peace, prosperity, and happiness. If this is the case, then the argument of Structure must meet an
extraordinarily high burden. Surely there are some individuals who are advantaged
by legal regimes that restrict property and contract rights: one example might
be highly placed members of the nomenclatura
in the former Soviet Union. Another
possibility is that the argument of Structure is addressed to hypothetical
individuals behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance [FN5] as to their
present circumstances. If Barnett
intends his argument to rest on this sort of contractarian premise, then
Structure fails to acknowledge the many criticisms that have been leveled at
this form of political justification.
Yet another possibility is that the hypothetical imperative is addressed
to society as a whole. For example, it
might be the case that the argument of Structure is based on a utilitarian
principle of the greatest "happiness, peace, and prosperity" for the
greatest number. If Structure rests on
this sort of consequentialism, then Barnett owes us an explanation for Structure's
failure to deal with the many objections to consequentialism raised by moral
and political philosophers. These
foundational questions are important, and they will be taken up again, after
this brief overview of the structure of Structure has been completed.
B. The
Method of Structure
After the first chapter, most of Structure
is devoted to the development of the thesis that the liberal conception of
justice is the best solution to the problems of knowledge (chapters 2-6),
interest (chapters 7-9), and power (chapters 10-14). A preliminary word about the method of Structure may help to
clarify the nature of Barnett's claims and his arguments for them. The central claims of Structure are
empirical. Barnett argues for the
existence of the *1784 problems of knowledge, interest, and power on the
basis of evidence about the nature of human beings and their social
interaction. How does Barnett support
these empirical claims? For the most
part, the answer to this question is not through the use of social science
research or history. Rather, Barnett's
method is primarily to appeal to common-sense premises that are likely to be
widely shared. Some readers may object
to this method on the ground that it is insufficiently rigorous. There is certainly something to this
objection. Before we make radical
changes in social organization on the basis of Barnett's arguments, we would
surely want to subject his empirical premises to the most rigorous testing,
employing all of the resources of social science to the extent that they would
provide useful confirmation or refutation of Barnett's views. Nonetheless, Barnett's method stands in an
important tradition of social thought.
Some of his armchair observations about human nature rely on the same
sort of insights as did similar observations made by Thomas Hobbes and Adam
Smith. Some of the empirical premises
of Structure might be viewed as plausible hypotheses as opposed to proven
conclusions. Some of Barnett's premises
are, in fact, unassailable on empirical grounds. For example, it is obviously true that each of us has empirical
knowledge about our own circumstances that is not shared by total strangers (p.
31); social science will have little to add concerning the truth of such premises.
C.
Knowledge, Interest, and Power
Much of the merit of Structure lies in its
detailed development of Barnett's central thesis--that the problems of
knowledge, interest, and power require the liberal conception of justice, given
the goal of providing each individual with the opportunity to pursue happiness,
security, and stability. Not only does
the development of the problems of knowledge, interest, and power account for
the lion's share of Structure's text; this exposition is the heart of Barnett's
argument. The success or failure of Structure
lies in Barnett's ability to persuade readers that these are serious problems
and that no form of social organization can succeed unless they are overcome.
1. Three
Problems of Knowledge
The first cluster of problems of social
interaction, Barnett calls "[t]he [p] roblems of [k]nowledge" (p.
27). There are actually three distinct
problems of knowledge. The first of
these (called "the first-order problem of knowledge") focuses on the
relationship between individualized knowledge and effective resource use. The identification of this problem is not
original with Barnett, who acknowledges *1785 the work of the economist
Friedrich Hayek. [FN6] Each
individual has personal knowledge (of her own perceptions, preferences, needs, desires, abilities, and opportunities)
that is, for the most part, inaccessible to other members of society (pp.
30-31). In addition, each individual
has local knowledge that is shared only by limited groups or associations (p.
34). In order for individuals to be
able to use resources, they must act on the basis of their personal and local
knowledge, yet take into account their ignorance of the personal and local
knowledge that is in the possession of others (p. 36). This problem is relevant to one of the basic
questions about desirable forms of social organization: should society be
ordered on the basis of centralized authority or decentralized individual decisionmaking
(pp. 45-50)? Barnett argues that
jurisdiction over resources should be vested so as to permit the use of
personal and local knowledge relevant to use of the particular resources. Individuals should be given rights of
exclusive control over the resources they will use (p. 52). Permitting
consensual transfer of jurisdiction over resources allows individuals to use
their personal and local knowledge.
Requiring that such transfers be consensual provides a mechanism by
which each individual can take into account the personal and local knowledge of
others that is relevant to the use of the resource; that mechanism is the
market price (pp. 52-54). These
arguments are the foundations for Barnett's first formulation of the liberal
conception of justice, which includes the right of several property, the right
of first possession, and the right of freedom of contract (p. 83).
The second-order problem of knowledge deals with the difficulties
created by the need to make rights publicly available--that is, to make
knowledge of the actions required by justice available to everyone (p. 85).
Barnett recognizes that this problem of knowledge is closely connected with the
ideal of the rule of law, and, in particular, with the notion that the rule of
law requires that the law be public (p. 89).
Barnett draws a distinctive conclusion from this requirement, one that
is key to his claim that solving the problems of knowledge, interest, and power
requires a minimal role for the state.
The key idea is that in order for individuals to know what the law is,
the set of legal rights must satisfy the requirement of compossibility.
Compossibility requires that exercise of any right by a citizen be guaranteed
not to interfere with the exercise of any right by any other citizen. This entails the conclusion that rights
cannot contradict or be in tension with one another (pp. 90-92). Putting it another way, each individual must
have a sphere of liberty that does not invade the sphere of any other
individual. This move is important, *1786 because it justifies the
limitation of the liberal conception of justice to negative rights, such as
rights of property and contract. The
corollary of this limitation is that positive rights, such as a right to
welfare, are excluded. Positive rights
can collide with negative rights and hence can violate the requirement of
compossibility.
The second-order problem of knowledge
constrains the substantive content of the
law in another way. It is possible to
distinguish between legal rules on the basis of their ability to provide
certain guidance in concrete cases. Barnett demonstrates this point with one of
many illustrative stories involving a fictional pair, Ann and Ben. Imagine, for example, that the law provides
the following rule for the acquisition of land: "The one who needs the
land the most gets it." Does this
rule communicate a determinate standard for conduct that could guide the
actions of Ben and Ann?
Assume that both Ann and Ben are well aware
of this precept in advance of any dispute between them. Ben comes across the clearing. Can he know that he needs it more than
Ann? When Ann returns, how can she know
whether to vacate or remain? The
substance of this precept gives rise to a second-order problem of knowledge
concerning what justice requires. [p.
100]
A rule that grants the first possessor
jurisdiction over the land might be underdeterminate in particular cases but it
would not be inherently uncertain in the same way that the
greater-need-for-the-land rule must be (p. 100).
The third-order problem of knowledge
concerns the need to specify concrete and particular conventions of justice
that can guide action (p. 108). This
problem arises in part because a theory of justice underdetermines the content
of action-guiding rules. For example,
the abstract formulations of the rights to private property and freedom of
contract that Barnett specifies in his liberal conception of justice are
insufficiently concrete to decide particular disputes. In order to overcome this part of the
problem, some process for specifying the content of the rules must be
instituted. This process of
specification requires knowledge of the complexities of human interaction (pp.
113-14). Barnett claims that an
evolutionary process of common-law adjudication is the preferred solution to
the third-order problem of knowledge (pp. 114-30).
2. The
Problems of Interest
Independent of problems of knowledge are
problems of interest. Barnett
identifies three of these. The first is
the problem of partiality. If each
individual is to pursue happiness, then social interaction must be structured
so as to allow individuals to pursue their own interests. Yet partiality to one's own interests may
interfere with the pursuit by others of their interests (pp. 135-38). Barnett claims that decentralized
jurisdiction over resources in the *1787 form of property rights and
freedom of contract solves the problem of partiality. A regime of property and contract allows individuals to pursue
their own projects and interests.
Moreover, property rights and the requirement that transfer be
consensual insure that each must take the interests of the other into account
before using resources over which the other has jurisdiction (pp. 139-41). Barnett illustrates these abstract points
with another fable of Ann and Ben:
If Ben wants to build a home on a corner of the land that Ann has
cultivated for crops, then he must offer Ann something she would prefer to that
which he is asking her to give up. In
this way, Ann's partial interests are incorporated into Ben's cost of
choice. When pursuing his personal
projects, Ann's rights of several property and freedom from contract require
Ben to act "impartially" with respect to Ann's interest whether he
wants to or not. [p. 140]
The problem of partiality illustrates one of
the central features of the argumentative structure of Structure. Barnett claims that the problems of
knowledge, interest, and power provide independent justifications for the
liberal conception of justice. Even if
there were no problem of knowledge, and Ben had independent knowledge of Ann's
interests in her land, Ben's partiality to his own interests creates the risk
that he would act without taking Ann's interests into account. And even if Ben were perfectly impartial, he
could not take Ann's interests into account given that there is a problem of
knowledge.
The second problem of interest is the
incentive problem. Barnett's discussion
of this problem begins with the "subjective 'cost of choice," ' [FN7] i.e., the costs borne by anyone who makes a choice
involving the use of resources. Because
of a problem of knowledge, only the individual who makes the choice is fully
aware of the nature and extent of such costs (pp. 150-53). Because of such
costs, individuals normally require incentives to discover and use information about the effective use of
resources. Barnett argues that a right
of first possession, a right of private property, and freedom of contract
provide a guarantee that individuals who incur such costs will not have the
benefits taken away from them by others.
Thus, the liberal conception of justice provides incentives for the
efficient use of resources (p. 155). In
addition, the incentive problem justifies the addition of another right to the
liberal conception, a right of restitution: "[O]ne who violates the rights
that define justice must compensate the victim of the rights violation for the
harm caused by the injustice" (p. 159).
*1788 Barnett's discussion of the
incentive problem is also the occasion for a provocative discussion of public
goods and free rider problems. The conventional economic wisdom about public
goods is that nonexcludable goods like clean air or national defense cannot be
provided by markets because of free-rider problems. Who would sign up for a voluntary national defense
subscription? Barnett's challenge to
this conventional wisdom consists of a number of burden-shifting
strategies. Primary among these is a
move that is repeated frequently in Structure: Barnett challenges the advocates
of state- provided public goods to show that the state can actually deliver the
goods, given the problems of knowledge, interest, and power (p. 162). Another burden- shifting move is to suggest
that the assumption that markets cannot provide particular goods may result
from a failure of imagination. Here
Barnett invokes the famous example of
lighthouses, often assumed to be public goods by armchair economists (pp.
163-64), but shown by Ronald Coase to be frequently supported by fees charged
by nearby ports. [FN8] These burden-shifting strategies are surely
thought provoking, but they hardly carry the day for the radical hypothesis (perhaps
implicit in Structure, but never explicitly advanced by Barnett) that there are
no public goods, the provision of which by a state would actually advance the
common interest in happiness, peace, and prosperity.
The third problem of interest is the
compliance problem. The liberal
conception of justice requires those who violate the rights of others to
provide restitution for the harm done.
But in the absence of an enforcement mechanism, rights violators will
lack an incentive to provide such restitution.
Barnett argues that this problem justifies a right to collect such
compensation by force (pp. 174-81) and a right of self-defense (pp. 185-
91). This section of the book provides
an apt example of Barnett's ability to combine the discussion of concrete
policy with abstract political theory.
In a world where many rights violators are sure to be impecunious, the
question arises as to how compensation is to be collected. Barnett's solution is to restructure the
public system of prisons into privately owned engines of entrepreneurship, with
prisoners engaging in market transactions both within and without the penal
system (pp. 176-81). Particularly
intriguing is his discussion of Maine's
inmate craft program, with some inmates supposedly earning as much as $100,000
per year (p. 180).
*1789 3. The Problems of Power
The third and final set of problems of
social interaction consists of problems of power. Although Barnett claims that the problems of knowledge and
interest are independent of one another, the problem of power is derivative of
the problem of interest in the following sense: because the compliance problem
justifies the use of force, the problem of power arises in connection with such
uses of force. Absent problems of
interest, the problem of power would not necessarily arise. There are two distinct problems of power,
the problem of enforcement (and nonenforcement) error and the problem of
enforcement abuse.
The problem of enforcement error arises
because no system of enforcement will be error-free. Some individuals who have not violated rights will be forced to
pay compensation, and some individuals whose rights have been violated will not
receive compensation. A similar problem
arises with respect to erroneous use of self-defense. Thus, the question arises as to how to minimize the severity and
frequency of enforcement error (pp. 198-99). Barnett's proposal for reducing
the severity of enforcement error is both simple and controversial. Barnett argues for a principle of strict
proportionality, "that the amount of the sanction be limited to what is necessary to fully compensate without
overcompensating the victim" (p. 204).
Barnett then argues against the deterrence
theory of punishment on a number of grounds.
One of these is notable because it represents a departure from the
general argumentative strategy of Structure.
Barnett argues that imposing severe sanctions in order to increase the deterrent
effect of punishment is open to moral criticism on the grounds that such
punishments will inevitably also be visited on innocent persons because of the
problem of enforcement error (p. 228).
The moral intuition to which Barnett appeals is surely plausible, but it
would seem to rely on some prior notion of a moral right that is independent of
the concern for happiness, peace, and prosperity. Barnett also argues that increasing the severity of punishment may
not translate into actual deterrence for a variety of reasons. Among these are that criminals may simply
become more effective at evading punishment, or they may have such a high
discount rate for future costs that severity will have little effect on their
choices (p. 230).
The problem of enforcement abuse is actually
a more specific form of the problem of partiality. Given that those with the power to impose punishments will be
partial to their own interests, the power to punish or to use force to compel
restitution is likely to be abused.
Barnett argues that the problem of enforcement abuse is not resolved by
what he calls the single power principle, the notion *1790 that there
must exist a single institution with a monopoly on
the coercive use of force for each geographical territory (pp. 240-50). If power is structured in a simple
hierarchy, there is no guarantee that those at the top will not themselves
abuse power (p. 244). Nor do
institutional constraints provide a guarantee against such abuses. For example, Barnett argues that divided
government with a scheme of checks and balances is not a sufficient safeguard:
"Eventually, entrepreneurs of power--master politicians, judges,
executives, or outsiders called 'special interest groups'--figure out ways to
teach those who share the monopoly that each has an interest in cooperating
with the others in using force against those who are outside the monopoly"
(p. 254). Similar arguments are
advanced against the contentions that democratic elections (pp. 251-52) or a
right of exit (pp. 254-55) can guard against enforcement abuse.
D. A
Polycentric Constitutional Order
With the discussion of the problem of
enforcement abuse, Structure negotiates a crucial turn. The argument up to this point justifies a
strong set of rights, but does not address the question of institutional
structure. Barnett's discussion of the problem of enforcement abuse sets up the
most radical and controversial chapters of Structure entitled
"Constitutional Constraints on Power" and "Imagining a
Polycentric Constitutional Order: A Short Fable." In these chapters, Barnett moves beyond the
strong classical liberalism or modest
libertarianism that characterize the bulk of Structure and offers suggestions
that are radically libertarian and even anarchist in nature.
The key idea here is that of a polycentric
constitutional order--a regime in which "multiple legal systems exercise
the judicial function and multiple law- enforcement agencies exercise the
executive function" (p. 258). No
state acts to coordinate these private entities or resolve disputes between
them. All power is private power,
regulated by contractual agreements between individuals and judicial or
law-enforcement enterprises. Even
readers who are still on the boat when Structure reaches these uncharted waters
may wish to disembark at this point.
One difficulty that is likely to occur to many readers is parallel to
Hobbes's argument in Leviathan for his version of the single power
principle. Wouldn't jurisdictional
conflicts between the various executive and judicial agencies degenerate into
the war of all against all in which there are "no Arts; no Letters; no
Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent
death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short" ? [FN9] Barnett recognizes this problem and appeals *1791
to a variety of real-world examples of voluntary cooperation between competing
legal systems for dealing with jurisdictional conflicts, including rules
governing choice of law and personal jurisdiction (p. 277). But merely pointing
to such phenomena is not sufficient to make out Barnett's argument, because
these mechanisms work in the context of a legal order that subscribes to the single power principle.
Barnett does advance an argument against the
likelihood that Hobbesian problems would emerge from a polycentric
constitutional order. The crucial
passage is worth quoting at length:
Extended conflicts between different court
systems in a polycentric constitutional order are also quite unlikely. It is simply not in the interest of repeat
players (and most of their clients) to attempt to obtain short-run gains at the
cost of long-run conflict. . . . [W]here they have the opportunity to
cooperate, participants in even the most intense conflicts--warfare, for
example--tend to evolve a "live and let live" philosophy. [p. 276]
These remarks are suggestive, but hardly
dispositive of the Hobbesian objection.
The eminent Hobbes scholar Sharon Lloyd summarizes one interpretation of
Hobbes's argument as follows:
The state of nature is a state of war
because scarcity of resources relative to demand leads to competition;
competition, to fear of invasion (compounded by fear of invasion, not by the
needy but by prideful people in pursuit of glory); fear of invasion, to
preemptive aggression; and fear of preemptive aggression, to further preemptive
aggression. Given this state of
affairs, it is rational for people to make preemptive attacks on their fellows.
[FN10]
Of course, neither Barnett's optimism nor
Hobbes's pessimism may accurately predict
the fate of a polycentric constitutional order. Surely, however, more is required than Barnett has offered for
society to feel confident enough to make the leap to the utopian world where
the state has been replaced by private courts and law enforcement agencies.
E.
Responses to Objections
The final chapter of Structure offers
replies to a number of objections.
These replies are brief and suggestive in nature, and they are not
likely to satisfy Barnett's critics.
The sort of strategy pursued in the replies is illustrated by Barnett's
consideration of two questions that are likely to be raised about Structure. Why are the problems of knowledge, interest,
and power the only problems addressed by the liberal conception of
justice? Why not the problem of
inequality, or the problem of need, or some other problem? Barnett's strategy
here is not to take these problems head on, but *1792 instead to use the
central argument of Structure to shift the burden of going forward back to
those who raise the questions:
One ought not to infringe upon the rights
and procedures that make a well- ordered social life possible to address other
pressing problems if doing so will seriously undermine our ability to address
the problems of knowledge, interest, and power. Addressing these problems is a prerequisite to any hope we have
of effectively handling the other problems of social life. A society that
failed to deal effectively with the problems of knowledge, interest, and power
would be in chaos. And a society in
chaos cannot deal effectively with any social problem, however serious it may
be. [p. 326]
Stated in this fashion, Barnett's move may
leave his critics substantial room for maneuver. Grant to Barnett the premise that the problems of knowledge,
interest, and power must be addressed to some degree to avoid social chaos.
Further grant that social chaos would preclude the resolution of other social
problems such as need or inequality. It
may not be difficult for Barnett's critics to show that a society that does not
fully respect the rights contained in the liberal conception of justice can
nonetheless solve the problems of knowledge, interest, and power to a degree
sufficient to avoid chaos. Presumably, modern social welfare states address
problems of inequality through taxation and redistribution schemes without
falling into complete social disorder.
Barnett makes another burden-shifting reply
to critics who may raise problems other than those of knowledge, interest, and
power. He suggests that the burden is
on those who advocate state action to solve such problems to show that the particular
problem they pose cannot be solved within the constraints of the liberal
conception of justice. For example, the
problem of need might be solved by charity; Barnett suggests that history
supports this conclusion, although he provides rather scanty backing for this
claim (p. 326). Conducted at this level, the debate between Barnett and
his opponents is not likely to be settled.
Resolution of this sort of empirical disagreement is sure to be
difficult. Barnett and many of his
critics advocate utopian social structures that, because they do not actually
exist, do not yield empirical evidence to resolve disputes about their relative
efficacy in addressing either the problem of need or Barnett's problems of
knowledge, interest, and power.
The final chapter of Structure also takes up
an objection that is related to the problems of need and inequality, the
objection that Barnett's liberal conception of justice is inadequate because it
fails to take into account the problem of distributive justice. This objection and Barnett's reply to it can
serve as a vehicle for situating the project of Structure in the context of
contemporary political philosophy.
*1793 Barnett begins his analysis of
this objection by posing a series of questions about the alternative theories
that advocate forced takings to achieve distributive justice (p. 309). Some of these questions raise the issues
debated among theorists of distributive justice under the rubric of the
"equality of what" debate.
Does distributive justice require equality of welfare, equality of
opportunity for welfare, equality of resources, satisfaction of Rawls's
difference principle, [FN11] or something else?
As Barnett acknowledges, however, the lack of consensus about what
distributive justice requires does not excuse him from answering particular
theories of distributive justice on their
merits (p. 310). Moreover, at least
some accounts of distributive justice are sufficiently developed (those of
Dworkin [FN12] and Rawls, for example) so that Barnett could address them
on their merits if he chose to do so.
Barnett adopts a different strategy, pleading that because there are so
many different theories of distributive justice, it is appropriate for him to
"focus [on] some of the challenges posed for any theory of distributive
justice by the problems of knowledge, interest, and power" (pp. 310-11).
Barnett's most persuasive answer to the
distributive-justice objection is a variation of the burden-shifting strategy
employed elsewhere in Structure. Barnett challenges these theorists to show how
their theories can solve the problems of knowledge, interest, and power. For example, Barnett makes the following
argument about the problem of knowledge:
Let's assume we settle on a particular
conception of distributive justice. We
are now faced with the task of determining who will have their resources taken
away and who will be the beneficiary of the taking. Whatever the conception of distributive justice one adopts, the
circumstances of every person in the community, or state, or nation, or world
will have to be examined to see if they meet the posited standard. Does each person have "enough" of
the primary goods? Which person has a
surplus that may be taken from her to give to another[?] [p. 311]
But is this really a problem posed for any theory of distributive
justice? Because Barnett mentions
"primary goods," a feature unique to Rawls's theory, [FN13] we can assume that Barnett believes that this objection
does at least apply to that theory.
A close examination of Rawls's theory
reveals that Barnett's questions are premised on fundamental misunderstandings
of the *1794 nature of the theory.
A brief explication is required to show why this is so. One relevant feature of Rawls's theory is
the difference principle, which is stated in final form as follows:
Social and economic inequalities are to be
arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open
to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. [FN14]
This principle does not actually apply to
all of the "primary goods" as Barnett's question implies. Among the primary goods are the basic
liberties, [FN15] including the right to ownership of private property. [FN16] A preliminary
point is that Rawls and Barnett are actually in agreement on the principle of
distribution that applies to the basic liberties (although they disagree about
the list of liberties to be incorporated in a conception of justice). Rawls's first principle of justice is that
"[e]ach person is to have an equal
right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible
with a similar system of liberty for all." [FN17] Similarly, Barnett
holds that the rights incorporated in his liberal conception of justice should
be equal in their distribution. When it
comes to the basic liberties, Barnett's questions--"Does each person have
'enough' of the primary goods?" "Which person has a surplus that may
be taken from her to give to another?" (p. 311)--are simply misplaced.
With this technical point about the primary
goods out of the way, the substance of Barnett's objection can be
considered. In addition to the basic
liberties, the primary goods also include income and wealth. [FN18] Presumably,
Barnett's questions are directed at the distribution of these primary
goods. Once again, however, the
questions are based on a misunderstanding of Rawls's theory. The two principles of justice do not apply
to individuals directly; instead, they apply to the basic structure. [FN19] The question for Rawls is whether the institutions that
comprise the basic structure of society satisfy the difference principle. The question is not whether the least
advantaged individual in society is benefited by any given inequality in wealth
and income. Indeed, Rawls recognizes
the very problems of knowledge that Barnett raises and relies on them as part
of the justification for limiting the application of the two principles of
justice to the basic structure of society:
*1795
[T]here are no feasible and practicable rules that it is sensible to impose on
individuals that can prevent the erosion of background justice. This is because the rules governing
agreements and individual transactions cannot be too complex, or require too
much information to be correctly applied . . . . Thus any sensible scheme of rules will not exceed the capacity of
individuals to grasp and follow them with sufficient ease, nor will it burden
citizens with requirements of knowledge and foresight that they cannot normally
meet. [FN20]
The point is that Rawls has structured his
theory in order to take the problem of knowledge into account. To advance the debate beyond this point,
Barnett will need to move beyond the formulation of generic objections to
theories of distributive justice in the abstract and engage with particular
theories, including their responses to the problems of knowledge.
Despite this weakness in Barnett's treatment
of the topic of distributive justice, there is considerable merit in his
approach. Indeed, Barnett's elaboration
of the problem of knowledge sheds light on Rawls's discussion of that problem. Moreover, my discussion of Barnett's replies
to the distributive justice objection has been highly selective. He raises a number of other questions and
objections that may fare better when they are considered in juxtaposition with
particular theories of distributive justice.
To clarify, I should add that I am not offering a critique of Barnett's
theory from the perspective of Rawls's
theory of distributive justice. Rather,
the point of this discussion is to show that Barnett's attempt to shift the
burden back to distributive justice critics cannot succeed without Barnett's
engaging particular theories in depth.
With this brief examination of the final
chapter of Structure, my summary of the structure of Barnett's book is
complete. I now return to the topic
that begins the book, the theoretical framework that forms the foundation of
Structure.
II. The Moral Foundations of The Structure of Liberty
A. The
Foundational Strategy
Barnett claims that the argument of
Structure is properly located in the natural rights tradition (p. 17-25). His interpretation of that tradition is
based on the notion that natural rights are hypothetical imperatives. Given the problems of knowledge, interest,
and power, if the goal is to enable persons to survive and pursue happiness,
peace, and prosperity with others, then the rights specified by the liberal
conception of justice should be respected.
Barnett's argument is that given certain ends, the means are natural in
the same sense that the principles used by engineers to build a bridge are *1796
natural. Just as a bridge will fall
down if the laws governing the structural
soundness of bridge construction are not obeyed, so a human society will fall
down if the rights contained in the liberal conception of justice are ignored
(p. 4-7).
This account certainly sounds sensible, but
it is also ambiguous. Initially, we
might ask about the goals of happiness, peace, and prosperity. What is the
content of these ends and why are they choice-worthy? Moreover, the relation between happiness, peace, and prosperity
and individual persons is not formulated precisely. Is the goal for each and every person to be happy? To maximize
the total amount of happiness summed across all persons? To provide each and every person the
opportunity to be happy? Or is it
something else? These questions are not
clearly answered in Structure, and one might even suspect that they are
studiously avoided.
More generally, Structure is ambiguous with
respect to one of the central questions of contemporary political philosophy:
should justification proceed on the basis of deep foundations in moral
philosophy or theology, or should political justification limit itself to the
shallow resources of public reason? As
we shall see, this question is crucial to the argument of Structure. I will proceed by examining the implications
of each interpretation in turn.
Before I begin the task of clarifying the
foundations of Structure, I should note that Barnett himself believes such
foundational work is not essential to his
enterprise. After discussing whether
his approach is consequentialist or deontological, Barnett concludes:
"Perhaps all this suggests that how we describe or categorize the analysis
I will present here is less important than the merits of the analysis
itself" (p. 24). But this assumes
that the work of clarification is merely a matter of applying labels. If that were the case, then Barnett would
surely be correct to set the problem aside as a merely academic exercise. If, on the other hand, questions about
foundations must be answered in order to determine what Barnett's analysis is
and therefore what its merits are, then the proper answer to foundational
inquiries is not a plea of confession and avoidance.
B. Does
Structure Rest on Deep Moral Foundations?
One possible interpretation of Structure is
that its arguments rest on deep moral foundations. On this interpretation, Structure posits a particular set of
human interests (in happiness, peace, and prosperity) and claims that these
interests really are the true and universal interests of all persons. These interests are general and abstract in
nature. Given Barnett's account of the
problems of knowledge, the claim that these interests are universal need not
entail *1797 the further conclusion that there is any single plan of
life that leads to happiness for all humans.
There might be many plans of life that can lead to happiness, and the
selection from among these might vary from individual
to individual. Nonetheless, on the
deep-moral-foundations interpretation of Structure, it would be the case that
happiness, peace, and prosperity are true and universal human interests that
would serve as the ultimate moral foundation upon which The Structure of
Liberty rests.
1.
Happiness, Peace, and Prosperity
Investigation of the deep-moral-foundations
interpretation can begin with an examination of "happiness, peace, and
prosperity." Barnett has very
little to say about these foundational ends.
Indeed, his discussion of them suggests that he does not find questions
about these ends to be fruitful ones:
This natural law account of moral
"principles of society" assumes, of course, that "happiness . .
. peace and prosperity" are appropriate ends. While the essence or nature of happiness, peace and prosperity
may properly be controversial, should anyone question the assumption that these
are desirable ends to be pursued, additional arguments will need to be
presented. [p. 7]
To some extent, Barnett is on safe ground
when he assumes that happiness, peace, and prosperity are desirable ends. If not these ends, then which ends?
Questions arise immediately, however.
Initially, the three ends do not seem to be of equal moral status. Happiness is a good candidate for a
noninstrumental or final end: we desire happiness for its own sake and not for
the sake of anything else. Peace and
prosperity, on the other hand, might plausibly be viewed as instrumental to happiness. We want peace and prosperity so that we can
pursue happiness, not the other way around.
If these three ends are foundational, it is clear that happiness
provides the cornerstone of Structure's foundation.
As Barnett acknowledges, the essence or
nature of happiness is controversial
(p. 7). And the nature of
happiness might affect the argument of Structure. For example, the classical
Aristotelian view of happiness is that happiness requires a life of reason
involving activities done well, that is, in accord with the human excellences
or virtues. [FN21] One implication of this view might be that
an essential role of the state is the inculcation of virtue. [FN22] Barnett addresses this argument with his now
familiar strategy. He argues that the
burden is on the advocates of state-enforced virtue to show that they can *1798
overcome the problems of knowledge, interest, and power (p. 306). A full account of virtue, however, might
address these issues. For example,
Barnett's discussion of the problem of knowledge assumes that individuals
possess the knowledge necessary to make choices affecting their own happiness. A virtue-centered theory of the state might
counter that such knowledge can only be possessed and effectively used by
persons who already possess the virtues to a sufficient degree. Perhaps it is the case that only persons
with the intellectual virtues of theoretical and practical wisdom can make use
of their individual and local knowledge in a way that leads to happiness.
This is not the occasion to take up Barnett's challenge--to offer a
virtue-centered account of the role of the state in the promotion of virtue
that takes the problems of knowledge, interest, and power into full account.
Rather, the point is that an investigation of foundational questions, such as
connections between virtue, knowledge, and happiness, might undermine fundamental
presuppositions of Barnett's argument.
If Barnett contends otherwise--for example, if he claims that the
argument of Structure extends to any plausible notion of happiness,
irrespective of the conceptual framework in which the notion is embedded--then
a heavy argumentative burden goes with that contention. After preliminary skirmishing about the
burden of proof, Barnett will need to get down to the difficult task of
engaging particular theories of happiness on their merits.
2. A
Utilitarian Interpretation
Laying aside questions about the nature of
happiness, there remain questions with respect to the role that happiness plays
in Barnett's foundational argument. One
plausible interpretation of Structure is that its foundations are
consequentialist or utilitarian. The
first piece of evidence for this interpretation is negative. On the surface, at least, it appears that
Barnett does not rely on any deontological premises for ultimate foundations.
In this regard Barnett differs from Robert Nozick, who made self-ownership a fundamental premise in the justificatory
strategy of Anarchy, State, and Utopia. [FN23] Rather, his
strategy is similar to that employed by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty. [FN24] Like Mill, Barnett
seems to forgo *1799 any advantage that could be derived by assuming
self-ownership, autonomy, or rights of personhood.
The second piece of evidence for the
consequentialist interpretation of Structure is the reliance on happiness,
peace, and prosperity as the normative predicates in Barnett's hypothetical
imperative. Barnett introduces these
ends by quoting a sermon delivered by Elizur Goodrich to the Governor and
General Assembly of Connecticut on the eve of the Constitutional Convention:
"No more can mankind be conducted to happiness; or civil societies united,
and enjoy peace and prosperity, without observing the moral principles and
connections, which the same Almighty Creator has established for the government
of the moral world." [FN25] More particularly,
Structure takes as a given "the goal of enabling persons to survive and
pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while living in society with others"
(p. 23). Because Barnett has so little
to say about this goal, it is not clear whether the goal is to maximize
happiness, peace, and prosperity, to provide each person with a sufficient
amount of these goods, or something else.
A maximizing interpretation is not wholly implausible, however, and the
notion that happiness should be maximized is a straightforward version of
eudaimonistic utilitarianism. [FN26]
A
third piece of evidence is Barnett's use of consequentialist reasoning in his
explication of the first problem of interest, in other words, the problem of
partiality. Recall that Barnett argued
that the problem of partiality justified the rights of several property and
freedom from contract. Why was this
so? The example of Ann and Ben, quoted
above, provided the reason: "When pursuing his personal projects, Ann's
rights of several property and freedom from contract require Ben to act
'impartially' with respect to Ann's interest whether he wants to or not"
(p. 140). But why is
"impartiality" required? The
consequentialist interpretation of Barnett provides a natural explanation:
utilitarians sum interests (utility) across persons. Ben should be impartial with respect to Ann's interests because
the right outcome is the outcome that maximizes the sum of Ann and Ben's
utility. Impartiality across the
interests of persons is a quintessentially utilitarian idea. [FN27]
*1800 The fourth and most salient
piece of evidence is Barnett's explicit discussion of the question as to
whether his theory is utilitarian. It is interesting that Barnett does not take
an unequivocal stand, even though he recognizes the question. The crucial passage is worth quoting at
length:
Is a natural rights analysis
utilitarian? Though this type of
philosophical question is really beyond the scope of this book, for what it is
worth, my answer depends on how the term "utilitarian" is used. If utilitarian is viewed as a
consequentialist approach that evaluates practices by their consequences, then the conception of natural rights sketched
here appears to be consequentialist, though only indirectly.
. . . .
If utilitarianism is viewed as a general
theory of ethics or morality, however, then the natural rights approach
presented here, though consequentialist, is not utilitarian. The approach presented here does not provide
a theory of how persons ought to pursue the good life, the traditional province
of ethics. [p. 23]
Barnett is simply declaring himself in these
passages; he is not providing an argument for (or even an explanation of) his
position.
What are we to make of these remarks? One clue to Barnett's position is that his
position "evaluates practices by their consequences" and that it is
"consequentialist, though only indirectly" (p. 23). Here we need to be cautious. When Barnett refers to the evaluation of
practices as opposed to acts by their consequences, he is likely referring to a
distinction akin to that between act and rule utilitarianism. When he refers to indirect as opposed to
direct consequentialism, he might be referring to the act/rule distinction or
he might be referring to the difference between direct consequentialism as a
practical standard for decisionmaking and indirect consequentialism as a theory
for the evaluation of practical standards for decisionmaking. If Barnett intends the latter meaning by his
reference to indirect utilitarianism, then
his discussion may conflate two different distinctions that are made in
utilitarian theory. All of this
requires further explication to make Barnett's position clear.
Begin with the distinction between act and
rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism
takes the individual action as the morally relevant unit. Thus, "act so
that your action produces the best consequences of all the available
actions" is an act utilitarian principle.
For example, if in a particular case, breaking your promise produces
greater utility than keeping it, then act utilitarianism requires you to break
your promise. Rule utilitarianism takes
general rules as the morally relevant unit.
Thus, "act so that your action is in conformity with the set of moral
rules that maximizes utility as compared to other possible rule sets" is a
rule utilitarian principle. Even if
promise breaking would maximize utility on this particular occasion, rule
utilitarianism might require you to keep your promise*1801 if the
utility-maximizing set of moral rules required that promises be kept. Barnett
states that his approach evaluates the utility of "practices" (p.
23), suggesting that he is not an act utilitarian but a "practice"
utilitarian.
What does Barnett mean by "practice"
? Initially, he does not mean moral
rules, such as "keep your promises" or "do not lie." This is clear from his statement that he
does not have a comprehensive moral theory, "a theory of how persons ought
to pursue the good life" (p. 23).
By "practice," he evidently
means to refer only to practices that lie within the sphere of social ordering
or law. Moreover, Barnett's approach
does not seem to allow for the evaluation of individual legal rules (such as
particular statutes) by assessing their utility. Barnett makes this clear when he says that if utilitarianism is
"a method of decision making in which the effects of various policies are
assessed by determining their effects" (p. 24) then his view is not
utilitarian. Rather, it appears that
the relevant unit is the conception of justice. [FN28] We assess conceptions of justice by
considering their impact on happiness, peace, and prosperity, and then we
assess individual legal rules (statutes, common law rules, etc.) by their
conformity to the conception of justice.
Why should we limit our utility assessment
to conceptions of justice and avoid the assessment of individual legal rules or
even individual actions? Several explanations might be available to
Barnett. One possibility is that
Barnett believes conception-of-justice utilitarianism to be extensionally
equivalent [FN29] to legal-rule
utilitarianism and/or act utilitarianism; in other words, the choice of unit
for utility assessment makes no difference in practice. This explanation, however, seems
inconsistent with Barnett's insistence that his theory does not assess the
utilities of individual legal rules or policies (p. 24).
Another possibility is that Barnett believes
that conception-of-justice utilitarianism is
preferable to legal-rule utilitarianism or act utilitarianism because of
problems of knowledge, interest, or power.
For example, Barnett may believe that if individuals attempt to act in
conformity with act utilitarianism, they will fail because they lack sufficient
knowledge to assess the utility of their actions. It is not clear, however, that a similar argument can be *1802
made to justify the selection of conception-of-justice utilitarianism over
legal-rule utilitarianism. This is
because the problem of knowledge is likely to be more acute for conceptions of
justice than it is for individual legal rules.
Utility assessments require knowledge of consequences, and consequences
are relatively easier to predict for individual legal rules than they are to
predict for entire conceptions of justice.
Conceptions of justice impact many legal rules and may be consistent
with several different alternative sets of legal rules. For this reason, scoring the utility of
entire conceptions of justice is likely to pose greater problems of knowledge
than scoring the utility of individual legal rules.
Another possibility is that Barnett would
appeal here to problems of interest to justify conception-of-justice
utilitarianism. Perhaps legal
rulemakers are likely to be partial in their selection of legal rules if they
use utility as a standard because the utility of individual legal rules may
appear ambiguous or uncertain and hence provide insufficient guidance. If, on the other hand, legal rule makers act
in accord with the liberal conception of justice,
they may be able to avoid the problem of partiality, precisely because the
liberal conception forbids the selection of partial rules by guaranteeing
rights of several property, freedom of contract, and so forth. These possibilities are not discussed in
Structure. What is clear is that
Barnett himself provides no justification for conception-of-justice
utilitarianism, and that such a justification is required if such a utilitarian
theory is to provide deep foundations for The Structure of Liberty.
These matters are further complicated by the
distinction between direct and indirect consequentialism. The direct/indirect distinction could be
used synonymously with the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism. [FN30] But this
distinction is also used to reflect a related but different distinction, that
between principles "for use in practical moral thinking" [FN31] and decisions
that "would be arrived at by leisured moral thought in completely adequate
knowledge of the facts, as the right answer in a specific case." [FN32] If Barnett's
approach were indirect in this sense, this would mean that the foundational
moral theory is act utilitarianism. Act
utilitarianism would be the theory that would be used to evaluate the individual
actions made as a result of legal rules from the point of view of leisured
moral thought unconstrained by problems *1803 of knowledge and
interest. The liberal conception of
justice would provide principles for use in practical moral thinking at the
level of legal rule formulation,and the legal
rules would provide practical principles for use by individual agents when
making decisions concerning the use of resources in social interactions. [FN33] If this interpretation is correct, then
Barnett was in error when he stated that his approach is utilitarian in the
sense that it "evaluates practices by their consequences" (p. 23).
The text of Structure is not sufficiently
explicit on this issue to permit a confident judgment as to whether Barnett
intends his theory to be indirect in this sense. One consideration favoring this interpretation of Structure is
that indirect utilitarianism has been justified on grounds that are very
similar to what Barnett calls the problems of knowledge and interest. Thus, R.M. Hare, the philosopher most
strongly associated with indirect utilitarianism, explained that the direct
application of act utilitarian principles is "appropriate only to 'a cool
hour', in which there is time for unlimited investigation of the facts, and
there is no temptation to special pleading." [FN34] Given the central role that the problems of
knowledge and interest play in Structure, it would seem that Hare's indirect
utilitarianism is at least consistent with many of Barnett's central ideas.